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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
In all of the cases denying the exclusion there was no certainty as to
either the duration of the income interest or the amount of the corpus.
Specifically, either the length of time the beneficiary was to receive
the income was indefinite or the amount of property in the corpus of
the trust was subject to invasion. The income interests in the Rosen
trusts were not so infirmed. The income interests in the Rosen
trusts were somewhat speculative in nature. Certainly much of
their value depended upon future contingencies, but this only made
the problem of valuation difficult. The income beneficiaries under
each of the Rosen trusts had an unqualified right to income for a
definite period and no person had the power to destroy the right to
receive such income by an invasion of the corpus. Therefore, while
the values of the income interests in the Rosen trusts were some-
what uncertain, it was the certainty as to duration of interest and
certainty as to amount of corpus which distinguished them from
the cases cited for the government and made resort to the tables of
Treasury Regulation § 25.2512(f) actuarily sound.
Joseph R. Goodwin
Erwin Conrad
INFANTS-NEGLIGENCE-STANDARD OF CARE
Defendant, an eleven-year-old boy, was playing golf with his
mother and two other adults. The plaintiff, about 150 yards away
and in plain view, was struck by a golf ball driven by the defendant.
The defendant had been playing golf two to three times a week dur-
ing the season for the past two years, and in view of this, the trial
court charged the jury that the infant was to be held to the adult
discretion until mortgages and encumbrances against the trust property
were discharged in full in the case of Commissioner v. Brandegee, 123 F.2d
58 (1st Cir. 1941).
In Fischer v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 574 (3rd Cir. 1961), the settlor
and trustees had the power to invade the principal to make loans, and the
beneficiary's interest in this trust was subject to being cut off by any
attempt at alienation on his part or by his becoming bankrupt.
In La Fortune v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1958), the
trustee had the power in his discretion to terminate the trust at any time
and in Vogel v. United States, 42 F. Supp. 103 (D. Mass 1941), the
trustees had the power to alter or amend the trust instrument in whole or
in part at any time and to change beneficiaries or adjust the beneficiary's
share under the trust. See also Herrman v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 440
(5th Cir. 1956); Riter v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 301 (1944); Geller v.
Commissioner, 9 T.C. 484 (1947).
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standard of care. Held, affirmed. Considering the inherent dangers
in golf and the defendant's experience, this infant while on the golf
course is held to the standard of care of the reasonably prudent
adult. Newmann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Westchester Coun-
ty Ct. 1968).
The general principle that infants and lunatics are liable for their
torts' raises the question of the standard of care to be used in deter-
ming their liability for negligent conduct. At early common law,
minors and insane persons were held to the same standard of care
as sane adults.2 This was changed with respect to infants in the late
1800's' when a subjective standard was adopted which took into
account the child's age, intelligence, and experience, but insane per-
sons must still measure up to the adult standard of care.4 With the
advent of the automobile, courts again reverted to the strict standard
for children by holding children engaged in dangerous adult activities,
such as the operation of a motor vehicle, to the standard of care
required of adults.'
Currently, in a negligence action not involving a dangerous adult
activity, an infant is usually held to a standard of care commensurate
with his age, experience, and intelligence.6 The reasons given for
I Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 109, 22 N.E.2d 254, 255 (1939);
Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 269, 272, 113 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1960); 1 T.
COOLEY, TORTS § 66 (4th ed. 1932); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 32 at 157 (3d. ed.
1964).
2 See 3 TULSA L.. 186, 192 (1966).
3E.g., Western & Am. R.R. v. Young, 83 Ga. 512, 518-19, 10 S.E.
197, 198-99 (1889); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Slater, 129 ll. 91, 99, 21 N.E.
575, 577 (1889); Briese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 91, 130 N.W. 893, 894
(1911).4 Johnson v. Lambotte, 147 Colo. 203, 205, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (1961);
Shapiro v. Tchernowitz, 3 Misc. 2d 617, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1014 (Sup. Ct.
1956); Williams v. Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 446, 38 N.E. 449, 450 (1894). See
also M. GuTrmAcHER & H. WEmOFEN, PsYCmATRY AND THE LAw 355-359
(1952); Sadoff, Tortious Liability of the Insane: A Psychiatric Evaluation,
39 PA. B.A.Q. 73 (1967). Contra, Buckley & Toronto Transp. Comm'n. v.
Smith Transp. Ltd., 4 D.L.R. 721 (1946), a Canadian case holding no
negligence where a truck driver under the insane delusion that the truck
was under remote control failed to control it.
5 E.g., Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 111. App. 2d 17, 20, 192 N.E.2d 695,
696 (1963); Betzold v. Ericson, 35 Ill. App. 2d 203, 209, 182 N.E. 2d
342, 345 (1962); Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W.2d 859,
863 (1961); Baxter v. Fugett, 425 P.2d 462, 464 (Okla. 1967).
"See Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal. App. 2d 637, 642, 301 P.2d 440, 443
(1956); Hoyt v. Rosenberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 500, 503, 182 P.2d 234, 236
(1947); Grenier v. Town of Glastonbury, 118 Conn. 477, 481, 173 A. 160,
162 (1934); Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 510, 153 A. 457, 462
(1931); 1 T. COOLEY, TORTS § 66 (4th ed. 1932); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 128(3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 238A, comment b at 15(1965).
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this subjective standard are a common sense evaluation of children's
abilities and public policy considerations. An argument often es-
poused is that extreme youth makes one incapable of appreciating a
risk and living up to the adult standard of care.! According to one
eminent author, children generally cannot in fact meet the adult
standard of care, as they have not the prerequisites of discretion and
understanding which develop through experience. 8 It is also reasoned
that holding a minor to an increased standard would open a floodgate
of litigation from "play" injuries, resulting in unnecessary judgments
against infant defendants. Therefore, seemingly based on the under-
lying philosophy that the mistakes and failings of children are toler-
ated as conditions to which every man is heir,9 it has been said that
if the law of torts held children to the adult standard of care, it
would be shutting its eyes "ostrich-like" and unduly burdening in-
fants' growth to majority. '
Engaging in dangerous adult activities, however, may cause the
minor to lose the shield of his youth." The lenient standard for
infants, adopted before the advent of the automobile, did not take
into account the possibility that an instrument as potentially danger-
ous as a motor vehicle would be readily available to infants. 2 With
an increasing participation by infants in some adult fields of conduct,
there arose the necessity of balancing the immaturity of children
against the damages they caused. Therefore, courts recognized that
children engaging in certain dangerous activities which require a
minimum degree of competence should be held to the standard of
care of the reasonably prudent adult.'" Thus arose the double stand-
ard of care for infants. When a minor is engaged in common child-
hood activities, he is judged according to his experience, capacity,
7 Dunlop, Torts Relating to Infants, 5 W. ONT. L. REV. 116, 117 (1966).
8 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 32 at 157 (3d ed. 1964).
9 J. FLEMMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 31 (1967).
'
0 Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE L.J.
618 (1928).
11Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (1961);
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 16.8 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 283A, comment c at 16 (1965).
12 Note, A Proposal for a Modified Standard of Care for the Infant
Engaged in an Adult Activity, 42 IND. L.J. 405, 409 (1967).
13E.g., Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 Ill. App. 2d 17, 20, 192 N.E.2d 695,
696 (1963); Betzold v. Ericson, 35 M11. App. 2d 203, 209, 182 N.E.2d 342,
345 (1962); Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863
(1961); Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503, 507, 407 P.2d 50, 52 (1965); Carano
v. Cardina, 115 Ohio App. 30, 33, 184 N.E.2d 430, 432 (1961).
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and general understanding, but when engaged in dangerous adult
activity, that same child may be held to the adult standard of care."4
Licensing statutes, such as vehicle operator's statutes, can be con-
sidered as another reason for holding infants to a higher degree of
care than is otherwise required of the infant. Some cases reason
that since an infant is licensed, he has to observe the same stand-
ard as all other drivers. 5 But, there are contrary decisions, which
hold the minor to a subjective standard by arguing that licensing does
not increase one's capacity.I6
The standard used to measure the conduct of a minor engaged
in adult activities turns on the ultimate issue of whether courts should
continue to recognize that children do not have the same capacity for
judgment as an adult or should subordinate this factor to the protec-
tion of the public interest of compensation.'" There appears to be
a tendency to hold a minor engaged in adult activity to the adult
standard, as evidenced by the numerous cases involving auto-
mobiles.'" It was a small step to extend this standard to other situa-
tions, such as the operation of a powerboat,' 9 where a child is
operating another type of potentially dangerous motorized vehicle.
Language such as, "[i]t would be unfair to the public to permit a
minor in the operation of a motor vehicle to observe any other
standard of care and conduct than that expected of all others,"2 is
used to justify the results.
Newmann v. Shlansky extends the liability of minors even farther.
Golf was characterized as an adult activity and the driven golf ball
14 12 DE PAuL L. REv. 361, 363 (1963). See also American Family
Ins. Co. v. Grim, 201 Kan. 340, 440 P.2d 621 (1968) in which an infant,
who illegally entered a church with friends, was held liable for his negligence
as an adult when torches lit by the others caused damage, because the
wrongful act was done in attempting to accomplish an illegal objective.
I5 Elliot v. Jensen, 187 Cal. App. 2d 389, 9 Cal. Rptr. 642 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1960); Allen v. Ellis, 191 Kan. 311, 380 P.2d 408 (1963).
16 Harvey v. Cole, 159 Kan. 239, 153 P.2d 916 (1944); Charbonneau
v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457 (1931).
,7 See Note, A Proposal for a Modified Standard of Care for the Infant
Engaged in an Adult Activity, 42 IND L.J. 405, 412 (1967).
18 Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 Ill. App. 2d 17, 192 N.E.2d 695 (1963);
Betzold v. Ericson, 35 Ill. App. 2d 203, 182 N.E.2d 342 (1962); Baxter v.
Fugett, 425 P.2d 462 (Okla. 1967); Powell v. Hartford Accident and
Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1967).
19 Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961).20 1d. at 458, 107 N.W.2d at 863. See also Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 MI1.
App. 2d 17, 20, 192 N.E.2d 695, 696 (1963).
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was considered a dangerous instrument. This objective argument was
strengthened by a subjective consideration of the infant. The court
alluded to the facts that the infant had played golf for two years,
that he played with adults, and that he played as well or better than
many adults. The result was that an infant was held to the standard
of care of an adult while on the golf course.
Robert Russell Stobbs
5
Stobbs: Infants--Negligence--Standard of Care
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1969
